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This article is republished with permission by China Business Knowledge at Chinese 
University of Hong Kong Business School. You can access the original article here. 
A study in China by CUHK Business School shows that the mandatory rotation of audit 
partners can enhance audit quality 
Audit plays a significant role in the capital market. High-quality audit reduces the risks of 
inaccurate information, increases the transparency of the audited entities and thus facilitates 
financing and investment. 
Because of such critical function of high-quality audit, many countries and jurisdictions around 
the world have established and enforced stringent regulations toward audit practice. One 
example of these regulations is imposing limitations on the length of audit partner tenure. 
Regulators believe that forcing companies to change audit partner every few years can bring in 
fresh perspectives from new auditors who can be more independent and capable of discovering 
errors in financial reporting. 
However, it is difficult to gather available data to test the efficiency of such approach due to 
the fact that most countries do not require audit partners’ names to be disclosed and so 
researchers are unable to identify any partner rotations – except in a few jurisdictions including 
China. 
“In China, audit reports also need to disclose the names of both the review partner and 
engagement partner. Unless there is contrary evidence, the two partners sharing the same legal 
liability are subject to the same rules on mandatory rotation,” says Prof. Tianyu Zhang, 
Director of Center for Institutions and Governance at CUHK Business School. 
In collaboration with Prof. Clive S. Lennox at Nanyang Technological University and Prof. Xi 
Wu at Central University of Finance and Economics, Prof. Zhang’s study entitled “Does 
Mandatory Rotation of Audit Partners Improve Audit Quality?” confirms that mandatory 
rotations of audit partners improve audit quality of the firm. 
“Our result is significant as many countries rely on mandatory audit partner rotation rather than 
mandatory audit firm rotation to ensure high-quality audit,” says Prof. Zhang. 
UNIQUE DATASETS IN CHINESE AUDIT MARKET 
China is among the countries and jurisdictions which adopt a mandatory rotation of audit 
partners. Under Articles 3 and 5 issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) and the Ministry of Finance dated October 8, 2003, the review and engagement 
partners have to be rotated every five years or in the case of newly listed companies, at the end 
of the second year following the initial public offering (IPO). 
In China, audit reports also need to disclose the names of both the review partner and 
engagement partner. (Other jurisdictions currently requiring the disclosure of individual 
auditors include Australia, Taiwan, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Japan, and the UK.) Unless 
there is contrary evidence, the two partners sharing the same legal liability are subject to the 
same rules on mandatory rotation. Moreover, since 2006, for every public company audit in 
China, the audit firm is required to report the company’s pre-audit earnings to the Ministry of 
Finance. Using the pre-audit earnings number, the Inspection Bureau of the Ministry of Finance 
can identify whether a company had an audit adjustment to its earnings number. 
“Audit adjustments are indications that an existing misstatement in financial reports is 
discovered and then corrected by the auditor. In other words, the existence of the audit 
adjustments in a certain audit engagement shows that auditors have delivered high-quality audit 
practice,” says Prof. Zhang. 
HOW DOES MANDATORY AUDIT PARTNER ROTATION IMPACT AUDIT QUALITY? 
Proponents of mandatory rotation of audit partners believe that it can enhance the audit quality 
by providing an effective peer review effect. For example, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) in the US and the Cadbury Committee in the UK believe that a 
replacement partner could bring in a fresh perspective to the audit and is therefore more likely 
to detect and correct financial reporting problems. 
If an incoming partner finds the audit in the prior year unsatisfactory, he may inform others in 
the audit firm and thus damage the reputation of the departing partner within the audit firm, 
thus creating pressure for the departing partner. The departing partner will make necessary 
adjustments in his final year of tenure because, otherwise, the replacement partner may find 
reporting problems carrying over from the previous year. 
Some also believe that a newly appointed partner will be more independent of the client as he 
or she would have had time to develop a close personal relationship with the management after 
a prolong period and become unwilling to challenge its reporting, creating “a familiarity threat” 
as claimed by the Code of Ethics of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). 
However, this independence effect could be compromised, thus weakening the beneficial 
impact of mandatory rotation of audit partner. 
“A newly appointed partner may have less client-specific knowledge and, therefore, be less 
likely to find financial reporting problems,” says Prof. Zhang. 
FINDINGS 
Using a final sample of 6341 company-year observations for the period of 2006-2010, the study 
indicates that mandatory rotation results in higher audit quality. 
First, an engagement partner is more likely to require an audit adjustment when the partner is 
scheduled for mandatory rotation at the end of the year. 
“This suggests that the departing engagement partner has the motivation to clean up the client’s 
financial statements before handling over the audit to the new partner. This is consistent with 
a positive peer review benefit, whereby engagement partners perform higher quality audits 
when they are scheduled for mandatory rotation,” says Prof. Zhang. 
Secondly, the study shows that a newly appointed engagement partner is more likely to require 
an adjustment during the first year of tenure following mandatory rotation. 
“This shows that newly appointed engagement partners do bring in a fresh perspective to the 
audit and identify more financial reporting problems.” 
“Our findings have important implications for public policy because many countries rely on 
mandatory audit partner rotation rather than mandatory audit firm rotation to ensure high-
quality audit,” he says. 
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